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Ex Post and Ex Ante Coordination: Principles of 
Coherence in Organizations and Markets 
 
Abstract 
In the traditional trade-off between internalization and externalization, economists tend to 
under evaluate the role of intentionality (Williamson 1991) and to accord a dominant place to 
market coordinating devices (ex post coordination) compared to hierarchical coordinating 
devices (ex ante coordination). The aim of this paper is to show how the introduction of the 
concept of coherence, which is frequently invoked by economists in order to apprehend the 
firm specificities (Holmstrom 1999), may help to revaluate the trade-off between markets and 
firms in the advantage of the later. In particular, it will be shown that the attributes of 
coherence in ex post coordinating devices are fundamentally different from the ones that can 
be found in ex ante coordination systems. 
Key words: coherence, ex post coordination, ex ante coordination, order, rules, abstract rules, 
concrete rules, Hayek, Bateson. 
 
 
Résumé 
Dans le débat traditionnel entre intégration et externalisation, les économistes ont tendance à 
sous-évaluer le rôle de l’intentionnalité (Williamson 1991) et à accorder une place 
prédominante aux mécanismes de coordination par le marché (coordination ex post) par 
rapport aux mécanismes de coordination par la hiérarchie (coordination ex ante). L’objet de 
cette contribution est de montrer que l’introduction du concept de cohérence, qui est 
régulièrement mis en avant par les économistes pour appréhender les spécificités de la firme 
(Holmstrom 1999) permet de réévaluer l’arbitrage firme / marché au profit de la première. 
Nous montrons en particulier que les attributs de la cohérence dans les mécanismes de 
coordination ex post sont fondamentalement différents de ceux que l’on trouve dans les 
systèmes de coordination ex ante. 
Mots clés : cohérence, coordination ex post, coordination ex ante, ordre, règles, règles 
abstraites, règles concrètes, Hayek, Bateson. 
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1. Introduction 
Oliver Williamson (1991) argued that institutional economics was “vitiated” as it has attached 
too much importance to spontaneous mechanisms in comparison to intentional governance. As 
a result, it needs a “symmetrical treatment” of both of them. However, contrary to Williamson’s 
recommendation, Hayekian approaches proliferated in the 1990s. A shared idea by this school 
of thought was that the increase of information issues in the firm management would necessary 
lead to withered authority relations and reduction of centralized hierarchy. 
Unfortunately, Hayekian organizational analysis has left us with two questions unanswered. 
The first one stems from empirical research. As Richard Langlois (1995) noticed, most firms 
keep their specific organizational management and do not necessarily merge into the market’s 
spontaneous order or even imitate its way of operating. This fact seems to be partly in 
contradiction to Friedrich Hayek’s theory. Why do firms prefer a centralized coordination 
device? Why do they still plan and pay expensive wages to their managers if the best equilibrium 
should be obtained spontaneously by market relations? 
The second question is related to the loss of specificity of coordination devices. While placing 
spontaneous devices at the centre of the firm analysis, economists have excluded specificity 
from organizational studies (Favereau 1989; Langlois and Foss 1996; Cohendet and Llerena 
1999). The modern economics of organization can be, therefore, considered as a “defensive” 
(Favereau 1989) or a “frictional” (Cohendet and Llerena 1999) theory that emphasizes the 
trade-off between organizations and markets. It focuses on the cost side of the equation, instead 
of considering the specific benefits per se that could appear in organizational structures 
(Langlois and Foss 1996). 
                                               
1 The author is a Ph.D. student at ATOM, Paris 1 University. He is very grateful to Pierre Garrouste, Claudine Desrieux, and 
Tao Kong for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. This paper was presented at the annual 
meeting of the Association for Evolutionary Economics in Boston January 6–8, 2006. 
 4 
The introduction of the notion of coherence in the economics of organization may help to 
answer these two questions. First, organizational coherence may be a specific advantage in 
certain kinds of transactions and may explain the reason why firms and intentional 
coordination devices still prevail. Second, the analysis of coherence may help to distinguish 
market and organization relationships. 
The primary goals of this paper include developing and analyzing the notion of coherence. The 
second section will define the notion of coherence. The third will draw the distinction between 
ex post and ex ante coordination and investigate its consequences in the analysis of firms and 
markets. 
 
2. A Definition of Organizational Coherence 
In a paper published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Laura Waddell Ekstrom (1993) 
proposed a definition of coherence based on Bonjour 1985. According to this definition, 
coherence among a system of items is a matter of how well the components “agree or dovetail 
with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured system . . . rather than either a 
helter-skelter collection or a set of conflicting systems” (Waddell Ekstrom 1993, 609). This 
definition underlines two conditions for a system to be considered coherent: first, the 
components of this system need to be “organized” and linked; second, theses links must not be 
of conflicting relations. 
The first condition seems obvious if a structured whole is taken into consideration and not a 
simple cluster of components. As for the second condition, the absence of contradiction means 
either to ignore (but this may contradict the first condition) or to collaborate, or at least to go 
in the same direction. This implies that coherence should be an attribute of a system where its 
components proceed to fulfill non-self-contradictory objectives. 
But this interpretation has left us with another difficult question—what objectives are we talking 
about? If we are talking about individual objectives, this would lead us to the proposition that 
the coherence of the whole would essentially rests on individual attributes, which seems too 
restrictive. For example, it can be shown that two individuals of conflicting goals can still 
develop coherent actions. 
Let us take the example of a cleaning firm. Suppose that it has two cleaners (A and B) whose 
functions are complementary in terms of serving the firm’s interest. However, while A’s wage 
depends on the surface area being cleaned, B’s wage is strictly dependent on the quality of 
cleaning. Suppose that A and B are self-interest maximizers. At an individual level, A and B 
should be considered as having conflicting goals, since it is impossible to maximize both A’s 
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and B’s wages at the same time. Consequently, they are expected to contradict each other and 
exhibit an incoherent collective behavior. 
The above conclusion is arguably incomplete and unsatisfactory. From a collective perspective, 
it does not necessarily imply incoherence if the two cleaners try to maximize the quantity and 
the quality of the cleaning at the same time, as long as a strategy can be developed to reconcile 
the contradictory behavior of both agents. In other words, from the firm’s point of view, A and 
B are not necessarily considered to be contradicting the organizational objective by following 
opposite individual objectives. On the contrary, A and B may appear to have complementary 
actions if they can manage to negotiate a (quality/surface area) ratio that will give each of them 
a satisfactory earning. 
Similarly, in another example, a financial director of a firm has responsibility to limit spending, 
while a commercial director in the same firm has an interest in increasing it. Although their 
behavior may be seemingly conflicting, both the financial director and the commercial director 
play important roles in the firm’s coherent strategy. 
As a result, Laurence Bonjour’s definition of coherence needs to be qualified. The contradiction 
of the components has to be considered in relation to the objective of the system and not in 
relation to the individual objectives of the components that compose it. 
We may now propose the following definition of coherence: A system is coherent when all its 
components, by their positions, their functions, and/or their actions, are all carrying out the 
objectives of this system. 
This definition brings the analysis of coherence to a collective level. The behavior of a 
component is not coherent or incoherent with respect to another component but with respect 
to the system’s collective goal. In a coherent system, individual components’ action may 
contradict or oppose themselves while a common objective can be accomplished. 
 
3. Ex Ante Coordination, Ex Post Coordination and Coherence 
Provided the qualified definition of coherence, this section intends to probe how a collective 
objective is determined. More specifically, three questions have to be answered by the study of 
coherence in organizations: 
1. What brings coherence out of a heterogeneous collection? 
2. How does coherence maintain and develop itself? 
3. What are the underlying forces of the evolution of coherence? 
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3.1. Rules, Orders and Coherence 
The coherence of a system is more closely associated with the relations between its components 
than with the components by themselves. Understanding coherence does not always require 
studying the concrete components of a system. Instead, it involves studying the abstract 
organization of a system, that is, the order. This order needs a unifying principle, a rule or a 
rule system, which defines the order as one particular state out of an infinite possible set of 
states. There is, therefore, a logical link between the rule and the order. Every rule system will 
mechanically produce an order, and every order needs to possess one or several rules as a 
unifying principle. 
There are at least two ways to understand the order. For Gregory Bateson (1972), the order is ex 
ante determined. The rules that make it are a priori defined, independently from the system 
and its components. For example, a row of books on a shelf is ordered if the books are arranged 
by size or by alphabetic order. It is untidy if the books are placed randomly, without any rule or 
logical organization. Obviously, there is a large number of different rules according to which a 
row of book can be organized, for example, the alphabetic order of book titles, the author, or 
the subject. Regardless the rule(s) employed, the important thing is that for any rule to be 
chosen, there has to be a superior authority or an individual that makes decision based on 
his/her taste or other personal attributes. 
In contrast, Hayek (1937, 1945, 1952) thought of order as a semi-permanent system of relations 
between components. This conception concerns both his economic conception (the economic 
order) and mind conception (the sensory order). In The Sensory Order (1952), Hayek emphasized 
the fact that all mental sensations are connected to each other in a uniting and nonhierarchical 
whole. He went on argue that, therefore, the order does not exist because it has been previously 
determined by a superior principle. Rather it exists due to the fact that it develops connections 
between components that belong to the same level. 
The Hayekian order can be defined as a structure, an ordering which is ex post determined 
after an endogenous process. It distinguishes itself from Bateson’s order in the respect that it 
does not possess an ex ante defined principle. Moreover, it is a nonhierarchical system where 
each component or class of components may be associated with another component or class. 
 
3.2. Ex Ante and Ex Post Rules 
When they are applied to economic studies, Hayek’s and Bateson’s conceptions of order imply 
different ways of conceiving organizations. Bateson’s approach suggests that the rules of an 
organization have to make the actions of its members compatible in order to achieve a 
previously defined objective. A firm can give itself a charter, a procedural code, so as to fulfill 
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ex post 
coordinating 
device 
ex ante 
coordinating 
device 
Regularities 
the expectations of its clients or shareholders. By contrast, the rule system of a Hayekian order 
does not necessarily have any precise objective. It can coordinate itself with inexplicit 
procedures that rise spontaneously. For example, a habit or a routine may naturally appear 
without fulfilling any particular objective, simply as a consequence of the regular repetition of 
an event. 
In economic literature, these two kinds of rules are distinct, and each of them is associated with 
specific kinds of organizations. In particular, Hayek (1973) differentiated the “concrete rules,” 
such as laws and regulations which are explicit and come from a central authority, from the 
“abstract rules,” which are imposed spontaneously by the users in a decentralized system. This 
distinction was used by Hayek to draw the contrast between the centrally planned economic 
system and the market economic system. It is, however, possible to extend the implication of 
such distinction by taking into account the Coasian opposition between market and 
organization (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Langlois 1995). 
A simple typology is provided as follows to present the two kinds of coordinating devices. 
1. Bateson’s ex ante coordinating device. This type of coordination rests on a rule 
system that has been determined upstream in order to fulfill an objective given by a 
superior principle. The principle is superior due to two reasons: first, it is 
exogenously given and it is on the base of the whole set of rules, and, second, it can 
make the rules evolve in accordance with its own evolution. 
2. Hayek’s ex post coordinating device. In this device, rules are determined 
autonomously as the consequence of an interindividual coordinating process. These 
rules do not fulfill any particular objective but are the consequence of repeated 
interactions. See figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ex ante 
rules 
Superior 
principle 
Interactions, 
Regularities 
ex post 
Rules 
Fig. 1:  Main Attributes of Both Coordinating Devices 
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Consequently, two systems are defined by the nature of their distinctive coordinating device. 
The ex ante coordinating device is directed by a superior principle and controlled by a rule 
system that has an exogenous objective. The rules are created in order to respond to this 
principle, and the organization will need to be centralized. In contrast, the ex post coordinating 
device works autonomously. Because of their spontaneous appearance, rules are more the result 
of a social trade-off than the consequence of an explicit purpose. 
 
3.3. Hybrid Coordinating Devices 
A coordinating device may have a hybrid character if it is made of both ex ante and ex post 
coordinating devices. An example can be found in teams that have the attributes of an 
autonomous structure as well as the components of a bigger organization that functions as an 
ex ante coordinating device. Such a system possesses the attributes of an autonomous system in 
its subsets and those of an ex ante ruled organization at the same time. Configurations of this 
kind may be of much more general scope than a “pure” ex ante coordinating device. In fact, it 
would be very unlikely to find an organization that would be under the unique control of a 
formal rule system. 
It is also possible to imagine an ex post coordinated system that would integrate ex ante 
coordinated subsets. For example, a non-atomistic market is partly determined by the behavior 
of centralized organizations. As a consequence, these organizations may join their forces and 
influence the “spontaneous” character of the market evolution process. 
Last, how should we understand a deliberately implemented market that would be under the 
control of a regulation authority (i.e., an electricity market)? In this case, we can say that this 
market should be considered as an ex ante coordinating device since it fulfills an ex ante 
defined objective, even though in the process to achieve this objective it works as an ex post 
coordinated system. 
 
3.4. Coordinating devices and principles of coherence 
This subsection integrates the foregone analysis of coherence to answer the three questions 
raised at the beginning of this section. 
As mentioned earlier, a coherent system is defined as a system in which components are all 
fulfilling the system objective. In an ex post coordinated system, however, the collective 
objective is not obvious as nobody has implemented the organization and its goals. The 
collective objective merges in conjunction with individual objectives. Consequently, the 
 9 
coherence of a system ruled by an ex post coordinating device depends on the way it facilitates 
the fulfillment of each component’s individual objectives. 
A notion related to the present discussion is the Hayekian definition of equilibrium. For Hayek 
(1937), the equilibrium rests on the compatibility between individual plans in their relation to 
each others. However, this definition of coherence does not contain the notion of efficiency, 
because there is no superior principle to define its criteria. The prisoner dilemma type of Nash 
equilibrium is a result of a coherent ex post coordinated system, and it is sub-optimal. 
On the contrary, in an ex ante coordinated system, the collective objective is well defined by an 
exogenous authority, and coherence is not a matter of individual plans. Instead, it is a matter of 
how compatible the collective behavior of the community can be with this objective. Efficiency, 
here, has criteria. In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, if the objective of a regulation authority 
is to maximize the prisoner’s earnings, the results given by the Nash equilibrium are not 
compatible with the objective. 
The degree of coherence can vary from one system to another. An ex post coordinated system 
will become more coherent as the compatibility between individual plans improves, that is, 
when individuals have more objectives and preferences in common. Moreover, an ex ante 
coordinated system will become more coherent if the principle that determines it is clearly 
defined and if the rules are well respected. In a centralized organization, individuals do not 
need to look alike to strengthen the coherence, because the rules they follow do not depend on 
their preferences. 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the main attributes of coherence in the two coordinating 
devices. 
Table 1: Attributes of coherence in coordinating device. 
 EX POST COORDINATION  EX ANTE COORDINATION  
What is coherence? Compatibility between individual 
plans 
Compatibility of the collective 
behavior with the system 
objective 
What makes a system 
coherent? 
Shared abstract rules A concrete rules system 
How does coherence maintain 
itself? 
By the similarity of individuals in 
the system 
By the respect of the system rules 
 
4. Conclusions 
In summary, this paper has considered two important issues on coherence. First, it has put 
Williamson’s suggestion of attaching more importance to intentionality into context. It shows 
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that intentionality is an attribute of firms and ex ante coordinating devices, whereas spontaneity 
is an attribute of markets and ex post coordinating devices. Second, this paper has discussed the 
evolution of coherence. In an ex ante coordinating device, change is a top-down process, which 
must come from the authority that controls the rule system. In contrast, it is a bottom-up 
process in an ex post coordinated system, which can only be initiated from a collective change 
of the individual components. 
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